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COMMENTARY: USING SPECIAL WATER DISTRICTS TO
CONTROL NONPOINT SOURCES OF WATER
POLLUTION
JOHN H. DAVIDSON*

Professor Mandelker's article' is a practical and comprehensive survey of the nonpoint source program that Congress has defined in its latest
revisions of the Clean Water Act. The word program is highlighted because its use in the context of nonpoint source water pollution regulation
seems somewhat misplaced; in fact, there is little in the Act that resembles a federal program for the control of nonpoint sources of water pollution. Instead, Congress has made a statement of nonaction. What it has
done is the following: (1) created a statutory framework upon which it
may build in the future; and (2) provided some hints as to the form that
successful state control programs should take, for example, through the
use of land use planning and following watershed boundaries. That being the case, it is apparent that for the foreseeable future, nonpoint
source pollution will be controlled by state or local government, or not at
all.
I plan to use this commentary to extend Mandelker's effort, and,
with emphasis on agricultural sources, highlight several opportunities for
control which can utilize existing water management institutions.
I.

THE POINT-NONPOINT SOURCE DISTINCTION

MAY BE THE PROBLEM

The distinction between point and nonpoint sources is, as Professor
Rodgers has said, "one of the delightful ambiguities of modern pollution
law."' 2 But in relying too thoroughly on the formal and legalistic pointnonpoint distinction, we run the risk of becoming bound up in a game of
categories and losing sight of the purpose of the discussion, that purpose
being to control, with practical and effective methods, significant sources
of water pollution. The question of whether a source is designated point
or nonpoint ought to be less important than whether it is practically subject to control procedures. A major problem is that once a source of
* Member, State Bar of South Dakota; Professor of Law, University of South Dakota.
1. Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can it be Done? 65 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 479 (1989).
2. W.H. RODGERS, JR., 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 162 (1986).
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pollution is designated "nonpoint," it is assumed to be beyond the regulatory reach of the Clean Water Act and not subject to practical controls.
Because it does not enter surface waters at a particular point, it is not
thought to be controllable.3 Although correct in the legal sense, this assumption may be faulty in practice.
Within the vast catalog of nonpoint sources, there are some that,
due to their natural circumstances and relationship to particular human
enterprises or special legal status, are susceptible to ready control. Nonetheless, the control of other sources remains elusive. An example of the
former is irrigation return flow, which, although a legal nonpoint source,
enters surface water through discrete pipes and ditches and is subject to
understood pollution control practices. An example of the latter is the
runoff from unusual spring rains and snow melt. Still others, such as
runoff from acid rain, require an entirely unique control strategy. Thus,
not all nonpoint sources are equal, and the controls available for applica4
tion to one may be entirely impractical when applied to another.
States should consider setting aside the existing legalistic distinction
between point and nonpoint sources and instead regulate all significant
sources of pollution that are susceptible to practical control. Rodgers
points out that the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to the
Clean Water Act strongly supports a position that the point-nonpoint
source distinction can be explained as "singling out those candidates suitable for control at the source." '5 In Rodgers's words, "[p]ermit holders
should include polluters from whom behavior changes fairly can be
expected."

6

Despite its statements in support of the idea that all "controllable"
sources should be point sources, Congress elected to exempt a number of
"controllable" sources from regulation. These are sources of pollution
that were designated nonpoint by Congress purely on policy grounds,
and not because they fail to discharge effluent into surface waters at a
particular point, nor because the polluter cannot control the discharge.
Additionally, nonpoint sources are sometimes designated as such because
they are subject to local variations in climate, land, soil or cultural practices. Obviously, this is also a problem in regulating some point sources.
There is nothing implicit in local or regional variation that need defeat an
effective national regulatory program. Many state and federal regulatory
programs account for regional variability. Moreover, the control tool
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

146-47.
148-49.
150-53.
152.
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most popular with those who discuss nonpoint source pollution-Best
Management Practices-is singularly well-suited to dealing with unique
circumstances. States need to take up this issue where Congress has left
it and ask: "Of all the nonpoint sources which contribute significantly to
water pollution, which ones are susceptible to control?" That is, states
need to recognize that all sources are not equal and set out to regulate
7
those that are controllable.
II.

THE EXAMPLE OF WATER DISTRICTS

Expanding regulation to embrace sources designated "nonpoint"
has some potential to control agricultural runoff in a fair and practical
manner. The popular perception is that most agricultural runoff enters
surface waters after flowing across farm fields. While this simple picture
applies in many cases, it is not all-encompassing. In fact, a major share
of all runoff from farm fields enters surface waters only after having been
collected by organized water management organizations, typically irrigation, drainage or conservancy districts. Although such districts may be
private, they are usually organized as special districts under state law and
8
are thus quasi-governmental in nature.
In the western United States, over one-half of all water is controlled
by special water districts. 9 These districts supply irrigators with water
which is frequently returned to surface streams in severely polluted form.
In humid regions, land drainage by special districts is often the constant
feature behind agricultural production on what appears to be dry land.
Agricultural regions in states such as Minnesota, Illinois, or Iowa today
may appear to be naturally dry, when in fact the lands have been made
productive only after construction of extensive land drainage works.10
Here again, special districts-drainage districts-are the typical organizational form by which these improvements have been achieved.
There are at least five compelling reasons for farmers to install
drainage works. First, some soils, either due to their structure or their
topography, are waterlogged during part of the growing season. This
7. Id. at 148.
8. Corbridge, An Overview of the Special Water District, in SPECIAL WATER DISTRICTS:
CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE I (J. Corbridge Jr. ed. 1983) [hereinafter CHALLENGE FOR THE
FUTURE] (proceedings of the workshop on special water districts presented by the Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law, Sept. 12-13, 1983).
9. Leshy, Special Water Districts-The Historical Background, in CHALLENGE FOR THE FuTURE, supra note 8, at 13.
10. See generally H. W. Hannah, History and Scope ofIllinois DrainageLaw, U. ILL. L.F. 189,
194-97 (1960) (reporting that in 1959 there were over 1,500 governmental drainage districts in the
State of Illinois alone).
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condition interferes with the flow of oxygen to plant roots, compresses
soil, and hinders crop growth.'I Second, drainage may lengthen the crop
growing season on some farms. When fields are slow to lose the moisture
that builds up after the spring thaw or heavy rains, farmers must delay
field work. If the land is pasture, there are delays in turning livestock
in. 12 Third, drainage allows farmers to bring land into production which
nature has otherwise claimed as swamp, wetland, slough, or marsh. 13 An
opportunity to "make land" is an inviting prospect to landowners.
Fourth, drainage is a device which allows farmers to improve the productivity of land already in production. For example, land that is naturally
wet and has supported only grass may, after drainage, be brought into
row-crop production.' 4 Fifth, agricultural drainage pipe systems are essential to irrigated agriculture. Land under irrigation is exposed to the
risk of becoming waterlogged and, as a result, having chemical salts
leached into the root zone. By placing drainage pipes beneath the root
zone, the flow of saline waters is downward and out of the field. Irriga5
tion requires a drainage system to carry return flows.'

Agricultural drainage systems resemble municipal sewer collection
systems. A large number of small pipes carry flows to larger conduits
which in turn gather them for delivery to surface waters. The collection
occurs on both the surface and subsurface of the land. On the surface,
water passes quickly over the soil without infiltrating it. As it does, it
picks up suspended and soluble material. Subsurface water moves slowly
through the soil, and in so doing leaches chemicals from it. 16 Typical
agricultural drainage, whether in humid or arid regions, is accomplished
by a combination of field shaping and leveling, as well as surface and
subsurface drains. 17 Surface ditches and pipe drains, in combination
with open channels, are the most frequent methods used.' 8
A rapid expansion of agricultural drainage is now under way in the
United States. 19 Excess water continues to be a "major problem" on an
1I. FIELD DRAINAGE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 21 (D. Castle, J. McCunnell and L. Tring
eds. 1985); DRAINAGE FOR AGRICULTURE 7 (J. Van Schilfgarde ed. 1974).
12. DRAINAGE FOR AGRICULTURE, supra note 11, at 55.
13. G. SCHWAB, R. FREVERT, T. EDMINSTER & K. BARNES, SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION ENGINEERING 1 (3d ed. 1981). See also DRAINAGE FOR AGRICULTURE, supra note 11, at 1920.
14.

FIELD DRAINAGE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 20.
15. See generally Comment, Federal Law, Irrigation and Water Pollution, 22 S.D.L. REV. 553
(1977).
16. DRAINAGE FOR AGRICULTURE, supra note 11, at 93-94.

17. Id. at 93.
18. G. SCHWAB, supra note 13, at 8.
19. Luoma, Twilight in Pothole Country, AUDUBON, Sept. 1985, at 66, 75.
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estimated twenty-five percent of all cropland. 20 Moreover, as more of
this nation's productive farmland accumulates in the hands of larger operating entities, "bottom-line" demands for profit may further the expansion of agricultural land drainage. Irrigation is expanding in a
comparable fashion, mostly in the Midwest.
Drainage water of all sorts is the primary carrier of pollutants from
farmland and it also increases soil erosion. 21 All waters and soils contain
chemical salts, which drainage water will collect and concentrate.
Drainage water will also gather sediment. Especially troublesome for receiving watercourses are the accelerated flows following snowmelt or
rainfall. Waters that would naturally be retained in fields, or flow quite
slowly, are gathered rapidly and cast into watercourses. As these flows
accumulate in open channels, the soil is scoured and sediment loads increased. When the sediment also carries fertilizers, agricultural chemicals and trace materials, agricultural drainage water presents a serious
22
threat to water quality.
By Congressional decree, irrigation and drainage districts are
nonpoint sources, and the runoff just described is excused from regulation. 23 Apparently, Congress's rationale was that such farm runoff occurs over the surface of land and not at a particular point. The vision of
agriculture that Congress had in mind when it enacted this exemption
may be quite different from the situation which actually exists in farm
country. A large share of agricultural runoff is generated by and under
the control of state-created water management organizations, usually in
the form of irrigation or drainage districts. The runoff moves from the
land toward receiving watercourses through well-engineered artificial
systems. Excluding special water district systems from point source regulation is inconsistent with the regulatory philosophy of the Clean Water
Act and should be reconsidered by states which seek a practical way to
control agricultural runoff.
III.

THE AGRICULTURAL ANTECEDENTS TO BEST MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES, LAND USE CONTROLS AND WATERSHED
MANAGEMENT

Although Congress has elected not to regulate nonpoint sources, it
20. G.
21.

SCHWAB,

supra note 13, at 5.

Keene, Managing AgriculturalPollution, 11

ECOLOGY

L.Q. 135, 137 (1983); G. SCHWAB,

supra note 13, at 387.
22. See generally E.

CLARK, J. HAVERKAMP & W. CHAPMAN, ERODING SOILS: THE OFF-

FARM IMPACTS.

23.

33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988).
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has correctly recognized that effective corrective measures will incorporate Best Management Practices (BMPs), 24 land use controls and watershed management. BMPs recognize that national, or even regional,
technology-based effluent standards cannot work a cure. Since nonpoint
sources are the result of activities as various as human activity itself, controls must take the form of land management plans that consider the
unique circumstances of any given plot of land as well as the activity and
the reasonable alternatives to the activity. Congress has encouraged
states to develop BMPs appropriate for their geographic regions and economic activities.
Congress has also recognized the importance of land use controls in
regulating nonpoint sources. In 1972, when Congress finally decided
that industries and municipalities could not be enticed to curb their pollution voluntarily, it ended more than a decade of consistent attempts to
convince parties responsible for water pollution to control themselves.
Voluntary controls were a dream when applied to point sources; they are
no different with respect to nonpoint sources. Private parties, given an
opportunity to do so, will place the cost of waste disposal on the community. Only a legal sanction that will potentially cost more than the
amount saved by polluting a waterway will alter the behavior of a private
polluter. 2 5 This is consistent with human experience and there is no reason to believe that polluters through nonpoint sources are likely to be an
exception. Unfortunately, nonpoint source pollution will seldom be susceptible to control by the devices used to control point sources-effluent
limitations and water quality standards. 26 Nonpoint sources are less predictable than the point source pollutants generated by known industrial,
commercial and waste-handling processes. Nonpoint sources do reflect
the geologic and climatic conditions at a given site. An activity that generates few pollutants in one geographic area can be a major source of
pollutants in a different area of the country. Control of nonpoint sources
will require control of the way in which people manage land. The tool
will necessarily be land use controls. Zoning, which regulates the location and densities of land use, is the familiar form of land use control and
has a definite role to play in controlling nonpoint sources. 27 But in order
to control nonpoint source pollution, land use controls will have to en24. Definitions of BMPs are found at 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2, 130.2(1), 130.6(c)(4)(i) (1988) and 7
C.F.R. § 634.5(i) (1988).
25. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
26. Note, State and Federal Land Use Regulation: An Application to Groundwater and Nonpoint
Source Pollution Control, 95 YALE L.J. 1433, 1436 (1986).
27. Id. at 1437.
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compass management practices in addition to use categories. 28
Congress recognized in 1972 that land use controls had an inevitable
role in nonpoint source control. In describing the Section 208 areawide
waste management plan, it provided that a plan should contain procedures and methods "including land use requirements" to control
nonpoint sources. 29 Consistently, in the 1987 amendments, Congress
again required the states to identify enforcement methods, although it
did not specifically mention land use controls. 30 In distributing grant
money, however, EPA is given authority to prefer states which intend to
"control" particularly difficult or serious nonpoint pollution. 3 1
Watershed management, like land use controls, has an inevitable
role to play. Nonpoint sources are generated by human activity on the
land but are often carried to watercourses by diffused waterflows, most
often in the form of rainwater or melting snow. Efforts to control the
movement of the pollutants must take into account these waterflows.
Flowing water recognizes no political boundaries, but rather operates
within its natural jurisdiction-the watershed. Nonpoint sources will be
controlled not by any one landowner, but by a majority of landowners in
a watershed who cooperate to implement a common plan. Further, Congress has also recognized this need. In the 1987 amendments, it required
that state management programs, "to the maximum extent practicable,"
32
be developed and implemented on a watershed-by-watershed basis.
Although it is often forgotten or ignored, modem American agricultural history included a major effort at nonpoint source control which
incorporated BMPs, land use controls and watershed management. That
effort originated out of the great environmental crisis which today we call
the Dust Bowl. In the midst of a general economic depression, persistent
drought conditions struck the Great Plains. The black blizzards, denuded fields, choked waterways and demoralized human communities
associated with this epic are written into the national history and need
not be recounted here. What is important, however, is that the nation
turned to organized soil erosion control as a remedy. 33 Although the
remedial efforts did not solve the soil erosion problem, they have provided the agricultural community with some important lessons to use in
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 1437-38.
33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F)(ii) (1988).
33 U.S.C.A. § 1329(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
Id. at § 1329(h)(5)(A).
Id. at § 1329(b)(4).

33. BATIE, Policies, Institutions and Incentives for Soil Conservation in SOIL CONSERVATION
POLICIES, INSTITUTIONS AND INCENTIVES 25-29 (H. Halcrow, E. Heady & M. Cotner eds. 1982).
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addressing the current water pollution problem; the control of soil erosion is the control of agricultural nonpoint source pollution.
Out of the experience of the 1930s emerged a soil conservation establishment which has evolved and developed into the Soil Conservation
Service (SCS) of the United States Department of Agriculture. In its
early days the Service was energetic and creative and possessed with a
sense of mission. The procedures and methods which it developed for
dealing with serious soil erosion problems remain the fundamental methodology for controlling soil erosion and, concurrently, nonpoint source
pollution.
The effort of the 1930s began with research, including the development of basic measurement methodologies and the initiation of a system
of surveys which identified the most critical erosion problems. 34 The first
major technique which was employed was terracing. Although not a
universal cure to soil runoff, it still remains a basic tool.3 5 Terraces, of

course, are ledges of varying sizes constructed in the sides of hills to capture water that would otherwise carry away soils and nutrients. After
terracing, the SCS stressed cropping techniques, especially plowing and
cultivation on the contour which, like terracing, deters runoff and holds
the water, soil and other nutrients on the hillside. The most important
soil erosion control practice advocated, however, was crop rotation.
With crop rotation, a farmer divides a farm into several acreages and
alternates different crops among the acreages from one year to the next.
Crop rotation has enormous advantages: then as now, its greatest advantage is that it substantially reduces the amount of pesticides and fertilizers that a farmer requires. By moving different crops from field to field,
insect populations are less likely to accumulate around a host crop.
Weeds associated with row cropping are displaced when row crops are
followed by grasses, small grains or pasture. Crops such as alfalfa and
soybeans, which add nitrogen to the soil, follow nitrogen-depleting crops
such as corn and cotton. Nitrogen is thus reintroduced to the fields without the need for extensive artificial fertilizer. Finally, arranging fields in
an appropriate contour and strip pattern controls soil and water erosion.
Other innovations of the 1930s and '40s included the use of grass
waterways-seeding to stabilize grasses of low ground over which diffuse
surface waters tend to flow. More extensive use of pastures was advocated, particularly in fields where the soils were unstable or in need of
rebuilding. The SCS recommended stubble mulch to reduce rill erosion.
34. R. HELD & H. CLAWSON, SOIL
35. Id. at 64.

CONSERVATION IN PERSPECTIVE

60-61 (1965).
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Tree nurseries assured that farmers could plant wind breaks ("shelter
belts") to protect soils from the wind and to conserve waters on high
ground. Research developed new species of soil conserving crops, in36
cluding the reintroduction of native species.
The SCS also considered how to gain acceptance of these new methods. The cooperation of private landowners was critical and thus was
encouraged by substantial federal subsidy of conservation improvements.
We can now only speculate whether farmers would have cooperated in
the absence of financial aid.
Soil conservation special districts were advocated by the SCS in order to organize landowners and allow them to develop common solutions
to common erosion problems. The "whole farm conservation plan"-an
integrated plan of soil erosion control practices for an entire farming
operation-was developed and complemented by soil capability
classifications.
Given the severity of today's nonpoint source and groundwater pollution problems, it appears that soil conservation measures were either
unsuccessful or were abandoned. There is likely no specific answer. Perhaps conservation measures worked where they were used, but were not
universally adopted or continued; why this occurred is debatable. Certainly an end to the drought followed by the agricultural prosperity associated with war and post-war economic growth affected the adoption and
use of conservation measures, as did the advent of the post-war consolidation of agricultural land holdings and the trend toward grain crop specialization. It has been argued, however, and with some considerable
proof, that the primary reason for agriculture's general abandonment of
soil conserving practices is that the lead federal agency-the SCSshifted its emphasis from soil erosion control to production enhancement. As Held and Clawson conclude:
Gradually during the general period 1935 to 1950, and to some extent
subconsciously, the emphasis of the whole group of soil conservationists, in both public and private programs, shifted from the control of
soil erosion to the management of the land for greater productivity.
This was in many respects a natural evolution, yet it greatly changed
the basic purpose of the soil programs, especially when viewed from a
national or social point of view.
The first programs were primarily for the maintenance of the existing basic productive capacity in the land, especially by preventing
the loss of soil material through wind or water erosion. While such
programs resulted in some increases in productive capacity, this was
not their primary emphasis. But the later programs clearly indicate
36. Id. at 65-67.
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major concern with the building of additional productive capacity and
with adding to current inputs as a means of affecting output. This shift
in emphasis often made good sense to the farmer. Generally speaking,
he was less interested in saving his soil, as such, than in increasing his
income. Measures to reduce soil erosion to prevent loss of income at
some future date were less appealing than measures to increase his output today or tomorrow. In many cases, small adaptations of erosion
control programs led to substantial increases in output.
Similarly, the shift in emphasis made good sense to SCS, primarily
because it was a means of interesting farmers in the agency's program
and in making them more favorably disposed to the agency. Since SCS
was engaged in serious conflict with bureaucratic rivals... it needed to
build popular and political support wherever and however it could.
Adapting its program to what farmers were interested in was surely
one effective device. Presumably, SCS advocated only programs in
whose technical soundness it strongly believed; its emphasis upon planning for the whole farm, which often led to controversy with other
agencies and farmers, seems proof of this. But, within the range of
technically sound programs, a public agency is often wise to push popular programs; in this way, it not only assures its own health and continued existence, but obtains the means for carrying out later programs
which currently seem less popular.
But this shift in emphasis of the SCS program is much more dubious from a national or social viewpoint. To the extent that it was effective on the lands to which it was applied-and we must assume that it
was effective to a considerable degree-it surely increased total agricultural output of those lands over what it otherwise would have been.
Except for the war years, these were years when the national agricultural program was concerned with limiting total agricultural output to
meet effective demand at politically acceptable prices. Various expensive programs were being directed to this end. Whatever may have
been the public statements of the Secretaries of Agriculture during this
period, a fundamental conflict in purpose and in results of programs
existed. One part of the Department of Agriculture was spending large
sums of public money to control output; other parts were spending
smaller, but still substantial, sums to increase it-and no small part of
the rationale for the latter expenditures was the need
for public sup37
port in the continued struggle of SCS for existence.
With the shift to production enhancement, the SCS acquiesced in
the abandonment of crop rotation and other conserving practices. The
lessons of the Dust Bowl faded into the background of modern economic
activity. But the experience demonstrated a workable solution to soil
erosion and nonpoint source pollution. The question now is how to return to the appropriate conservation practices.
Soil conservation districts and farm soil conservation plans, in par37. Id. at 69-73. See also Williams, Soil Conservation and Water Pollution Control: The Muddy
Record of the United States Department of Agriculture, 7 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 365 (1979).
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ticular, merit careful review. In the 1930s, the SCS adopted the soil conservation district model to foster a local approach to the soil erosion
problem. The idea called for SCS to provide technical service, advice
and money. In exchange, each state would enact enabling legislation.
The SCS published a Standard State Soil Conservation District Law.
The resulting special districts were to be created by a majority of the land
owners and renters in the proposed district. Among other things, the
Standard Act authorized districts to carry out erosion control operations
and to enact and enforce land use regulations. States did pass the en38
abling legislation, but only after some coercion.
The boundaries of soil conservation districts were to conform to
those of local watershed or other areas logically used for erosion control.
Further, the districts were authorized to enact and enforce land use regulations. These two vital concepts were, however, rejected by a majority
of the enacting states. Soil conservation districts were instead organized
39
along county lines and without police power authority.
The parallel between the early effort of the SCS to organize effective
soil erosion controls and the present stage in the efforts of EPA and Congress to organize effective nonpoint source controls is obvious. In both
cases, the lead federal agency sought to encourage local programs. And
in both, efforts to attract voluntary controls produced a system of federally funded "demonstration" projects. The federal agencies tried to convince states that local control organizations would need police power to
implement land use controls and would also need to be organized along
watershed boundaries if they were to achieve practical effectiveness.
And, in both cases, the states rejected land use controls and followed
existing political boundaries in organizing districts. Finally, in each case,
the amount of voluntary compliance by private landowners ran parallel
to the amount of federal cost-sharing money available.
The history of the SCS program demonstrates that an erosion
(nonpoint source) control program based upon free technical advice, local organization, demonstration projects and voluntary compliance by
landowners will work only so long as government pays the cost. When
cost-sharing dries up or cannot be used for production-enhancing practices, landowners are quick to abandon both the practices and the program. There is little, if any, precedent in our experience of government
38. Williams, supra note 37, at 376-78.
39. Id. at 378. See also R. Held & H. Clawson, supra note 34, at 47-48. In conformity with this
reliance on voluntary efforts, the SCS at an early stage established a nationwide system of demonstration projects, so that farmers and ranchers could visit projects and observe soil erosion control in
operation. Williams, supra note 37, at 375.
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to suggest that the problem of erosion and nonpoint pollution can be
solved by asking landowners to regulate themselves.
Despite this history (or perhaps because of it), states now show a
strong preference for the soil conservation district as the agency of choice
for nonpoint source pollution control. Professor Beck reports, after a
review of some 136 Section 208 Areawide Waste Treatment Management
Plans, that wherever agricultural water pollution control is an issue, the
prevailing choice of implementing agency is the soil conservation district.
Moreover, with only a few exceptions, the plans do not call for the creation of regulatory control programs but rather for the expansion of current voluntary efforts. Professor Beck also points out that these plans
prefer adoption of BMPs on a site specific, case-by-case basis. Examples
of preferred agricultural BMPs include minimum tillage, contour farming, critical area planting, crop rotation, terracing, grass waterways, pasture planting, and strip cropping. 4°
This preference which Section 208 plans show for soil conservation
districts carries forward the defects inherent in the original districts.
First, such districts are not now organized along watershed lines. Second, they are without the authority to impose land use controls. Reformulated, however, they could offer a useful option.
Another device which the SCS developed during its active erosion
control period, is the whole farm soil conservation plan. This too has the
potential to be reformed and refitted for the control of nonpoint source
pollution. The soil conservation plan is prepared at a local SCS office
with advice from regional technicians and constitutes a detailed plan for
bringing a particular farming operation into compliance with erosion
norms. Based on such factors as soil types, terrain, drainage, climate,
crops and livestock produced, and practical farm budgets, the plan lays
out a detailed methodology, usually in phases-it creates a system for the
farmer to follow. Presently, compliance with a plan is voluntary. 4 1
If we recognize that nonpoint source control will ultimately require
imposition of land use controls, and that the controls must require land
management that reflects local factors and relies on BMPs, the soil conservation plan is an established vehicle which is ready for deployment
should the political will appear. Because the SCS is already situated in
each county, and because the conservation plan is a format which is fa40. See Beck, Agricultural Water Pollution Control Law in 2 AGRICULTURAL LAW 223 n.362
(J. Davidson ed. 1985, Supp. 1988).
41. The Conservation Compliance provisions of the Food Security Act of 1985 make implementation of approved soil conservation plans a requirement for farms which have highly erodible
soils.
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miliar to nearly every rural landowner, it offers a unique opportunity for
action.
IV.

SPECIAL WATER DISTRICTS MAY PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE
IN CONTROLLING NONPOINT POLLUTION

There is no useful general description of special water districts because they assume too many forms and pursue too many purposes. 42
There are, however, some common elements. All are political subdivisions of state government, created by state law and limited to the powers
delegated to them by state legislatures. 4 3 They are governed by boards
which are independent of traditional local governments such as cities,
counties and townships. 44 They are "special" because their authority is
limited to the special governmental purpose of delivering and managing
water. For our purposes, the significance of special water districts is in
the sheer volume of agricultural water which they manage. It is estimated that around 1000 special districts are presently involved in water
delivery-principally irrigation water. 45 An unknown number exists for
the purpose of organizing farm drainage. 46 Because agricultural drainage has been a precursor to the enormous productivity of agriculture in
the Great Lakes states, there are thousands of drainage districts within
47
the basin.
Special water districts are well suited to the unique function that
nonpoint source control requires. Organized locally and along the lines
of natural watersheds, they are, by purpose and experience, the experts in
local water management. Although their potential to solve runoff
problems is no doubt limited and imperfect, it seems to compare well
with that of most, if not all, existing governmental entities.
Districts have the capacity to bring economies of scale to nonpoint
source control 4 8 and to mitigate the effect of the argument that farmers,
being "price-takers" in the marketplace, are unable to pass the cost of
pollution control regulation on to consumers. Drainage and irrigation
districts can develop systematic pollution control measures for all lands
within their jurisdiction and implement those plans in accordance with
their corporate financial ability. The cost of pollution control can then
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Leshy, supra note 9, at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12-13.
See generally Hannah, supra note 10.
Id.
See Leshy, supra note 9, at 12-13.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 65:503

be spread across all the landowners in the district, with a greater share
being assumed by landowners who receive a proportionally larger share
of district benefits. In addition, such districts can qualify to issue taxexempt financial instruments and receive subsidized loans from the
Farmers Home Administration as well as from state government. In
fact, special water districts are in large part designed to finance local land
management improvements efficiently and fairly.
Another feature of special water districts that is essential to
nonpoint source control is their flexibility. The notion of Best Management Practices recognizes implicitly that uniform or general control
standards cannot be used to regulate land management. Instead, local
controls are needed which can consider local climate, geology, and cultural practices, and develop flexible remedies. Landowner-controlled districts can be subjected to district performance standards by, for example,
being asked or required to reduce the flow of sediments into a river or
lake by a specific percentage. How such a result is achieved can be left to
the managers who know not only the land in the district, but also its
farmers and its management history. That special water districts are organized along watershed lines is obvious but basic. Political boundaries
are irrelevant to flowing water, and whatever entity is ultimately assigned
the task of controlling nonpoint pollution will necessarily have authority
to operate throughout the relevant watershed.
By merging nonpoint source control into existing water management institutions, significant and practical governmental efficiency may
be achieved. Ultimately, all water management goals and practices
would be integrated. It is an artificial act to separate the function of
delivering irrigation water from that of assuring that return flows do not
pollute receiving watercourses. Water management is a multi-objective
undertaking, and this needs to be reflected in the laws which state legislatures use to authorize special water districts to operate. Irrigation and
field drainage should not be separated from other water management
concerns such as recreation, wellhead protection, wildlife habitat protection, water right management, flood control, and so forth. 49 Special
water districts are in the best position to merge multiple water management objectives. The alternative to the merger of purposes is a continued
"layering" of governmental districts, corporations, and departments,
each attempting to achieve specified water management purposes. The
fairness in asking that special water districts manage for public purposes
49.
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is that they have been given a preferred status-private management
with governmental authority-in order to pursue the private economic
advantage of their landowner-members. In exchange, they should be required to internalize the costs of the pollution which their pollution activities generate.
For technical expertise, special water districts have traditionally relied on the Agricultural Extension Service and the land grant college system, institutions normally associated only with production enhancement.
If districts sought their help in developing water quality plans, these institutions could possibly be diverted to the important task of arresting
agriculture's pollution.
V.

THE SPECIAL WATER DISTRICT AS AN "AREA PERMIT"

Two-reasons why the United States EPA has supported the continued exemption of agricultural runoff from point source regulation is that
the number of permits required could be enormous and uniform standards would be difficult to apply on a case-by-case basis. In the development of nonpoint control programs, the states should consider whether
this concern is legitimate when applied to most special water districts. In
the first place, the techniques for controlling the flow of pollutants from
agricultural land are well understood and have been agreed upon for
many years.50 Drainage and erosion control engineering is proven and
predictable. There is nothing speculative about the nature of the practices that will work. Terracing, grass waterways, contour farming, strip
cropping, crop rotation, water conservation, preservation of natural
sloughs, and responsible use of chemicals are techniques that were
known in the 1930s and they have been regularly improved upon since
that time. The existence of special water districts helps to moderate the
problem of a large number of small landowners. A permit or similar
regulatory control need only be required at the points where the irrigation or drainage district finally empties into a watercourse. One district
may combine hundreds of farm operations into one system of outlets and
bring them under a single permit. How the district chooses to meet permit requirements can be addressed flexibly by the people who know the
land best-the district members. By demanding performance, but leaving the solution to the district members, it may be possible to achieve a
middle ground between voluntariness and coercion.
50. See H.
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CONCLUSION

Special water districts provide but one possible route to a practical
set of controls over nonpoint source pollution. The message that I have
sought to deliver in this short response is that the Clean Water Act,
through its sharply defined categories and methodology, may actually be
an impediment to our analysis of the nonpoint problem. We have
reached a stage where we understand the source of most nonpoint
sources, and we know that Congress does not intend to apply its regulatory system to them. States which intend to address the problem will
have to develop and implement their own programs. In the search for
the appropriate control methodology, and the institutions through which
to exercise that control, states may find that the nonpoint pollution problem is not dramatically different from the catalog of resource management problems to which state and local government have responded in
the past. States may also find that existing institutions such as special
water districts, are well suited to implement a response. The sticking
point is that these institutions operate most effectively when their mission
is clear and they are dedicated to achieving the desired result. If state
and local commitment to solving the nonpoint pollution problem is no
greater than that of the Congress, then local institutions will fail in the
task, no matter how well-suited to it they may be.

